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Besedilo spremembe konvencije se v izvirniku v angleškem jeziku in prevodu v slovenskem jeziku glasi: 1. The Title of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material adopted on 26 October 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") is replaced by the following title: 2. The Preamble of the Convention is replaced by the following text: THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION, RECOGNIZING the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, CONVINCED of the need to facilitate international co-operation and the transfer of nuclear technology for the peaceful application of nuclear energy, BEARING IN MIND that physical protection is of vital importance for the protection of public health, safety, the environment and national and international security, HAVING IN MIND the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States, CONSIDERING that under the terms of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," RECALLING the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, DESIRING to avert the potential dangers posed by illicit trafficking, the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and noting that physical protection against such acts has become a matter of increased national and international concern, DEEPLY CONCERNED by the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and by the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime, BELIEVING that physical protection plays an important role in supporting nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism objectives, DESIRING through this Convention to contribute to strengthening worldwide the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, CONVINCED that offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities are a matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures, or to strengthen existing measures, to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of such offences, DESIRING to strengthen further international co-operation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, CONVINCED that this Convention should complement the safe use, storage and transport of nuclear material and the safe operation of nuclear facilities, RECOGNIZING that there are internationally formulated physical protection recommendations that are updated from time to time which can provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving effective levels of physical protection, RECOGNIZING also that effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for military purposes is a responsibility of the State possessing such nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and understanding that such material and facilities are and will continue to be accorded stringent physical protection, HAVE AGREED as follows: 3. In Article 1 of the Convention, after paragraph (c), two new paragraphs are added as follows: (d) "nuclear facility" means a facility (including associated buildings and equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of, if damage to or interference with such facility could lead to the release of significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material; (e) "sabotage" means any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances. 4. After Article 1 of the Convention, a new Article lA is added as follows: The purposes of this Convention are to achieve and maintain worldwide effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat offences relating to such material and facilities worldwide; as well as to facilitate cooperation among States Parties to those ends. 5. Article 2 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. This Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in use, storage and transport and to nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, provided, however, that articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 4 of article 5 of this Convention shall only apply to such nuclear material while in international nuclear transport. 2. The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State Party rests entirely with that State. 3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties under this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State. 4. (a) Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States Parties under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. (b) The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention. (c) Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as a lawful authorization to use or threaten to use force against nuclear material or nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. (d) Nothing in this Convention condones or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor precludes prosecution under other laws. 5. This Convention shall not apply to nuclear material used or retained for military purposes or to a nuclear facility containing such material. 6. After Article 2 of the Convention, a new Article 2A is added as follows: 1. Each State Party shall establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction, with the aim of: (a) protecting against theft and other unlawful taking of nuclear material in use, storage and transport; (b) ensuring the implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and, where appropriate, recover missing or stolen nuclear material; when the material is located outside its territory, that State Party shall act in accordance with article 5; (c) protecting nuclear material and nuclear facilities against sabotage; and (d) mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage. 2. In implementing paragraph 1, each State Party shall: (a) establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection; (b) establish or designate a competent authority or authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework; and (c) take other appropriate measures necessary for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 3. In implementing the obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Convention, apply insofar as is reasonable and practicable the following Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE A: Responsibility of the State The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE B: Responsibilities During International Transport The responsibility of a State for ensuring that nuclear material is adequately protected extends to the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as appropriate. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE C: Legislative and Regulatory Framework The State is responsible for establish and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection. This framework should provide for the establishment of applicable physical protection requirements and include a system of evaluation and licensing or other procedures to grant authorization. This framework should include a system of inspection of nuclear facilities and transport to verify compliance with applicable requirements and conditions of the license or other authorizing document, and to establish a means to enforce applicable requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE D: Competent Authority The State should establish or designate a competent authority which is responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, and is provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. The State should take steps to ensure an effective independence between the functions of the State's competent authority and those of any other body in charge of the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE E: Responsibility of the License Holders The responsibilities for implementing the various elements of physical protection within a State should be clearly identified. The State should ensure that the prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holders of the relevant licenses or of other authorizing documents (e.g., operators or shippers). FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE F: Security Culture All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire organization. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE G: Threat The State's physical protection should be based on the State's current evaluation of the threat. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE H: Graded Approach Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE I: Defence in Depth The State's requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and organizational) that have to be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order to achieve his objectives. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE J: Quality Assurance A quality assurance policy and quality assurance programmes should be established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical protection are satisfied. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE K: Contingency Plans Contingency (emergency) plans to respond to unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities or nuclear material, or attempts thereof, should be prepared and appropriately exercised by all license holders and authorities concerned. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE L: Confidentiality The State should establish requirements for protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 4. (a) The provisions of this article shall not apply to any nuclear material which the State Party reasonably decides does not need to be subject to the physical protection regime established pursuant to paragraph 1, taking into account the nature of the material, its quantity and relative attractiveness and the potential radiological and other consequences associated with any unauthorized act directed against it and the current evaluation of the threat against it. (b) Nuclear material which is not subject to the provisions of this article pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. 7. Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States Parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency their point of contact in relation to matters within the scope of this Convention. 2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law, provide co-operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular: (a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof, and to inform, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations; (b) in doing so, as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information with each other, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material and shall: (i) co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels; (ii) render assistance, if requested; (iii) ensure the return of recovered nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence of the above-mentioned events. The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined by the States Parties concerned. 3. In the case of a credible threat of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility or in the case of sabotage thereof, States Parties shall, to the maximum feasible extent, in accordance with their national law and consistent with their relevant obligations under international law, co-operate as follows: (a) if a State Party has knowledge of a credible threat of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility in another State, the former shall decide on appropriate steps to be taken in order to inform that State as soon as possible and, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations of that threat, with a view to preventing the sabotage; (b) in the case of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility in a State Party and if in its view other States are likely to be radiologically affected, the former, without prejudice to its other obligations under international law, shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible the State or the States which are likely to be radiologically affected and to inform, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to minimizing or mitigating the radiological consequences thereof; (c) if in the context of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), a State Party requests assistance, each State Party to which a request for assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested and the scope and terms of the assistance that may be rendered; (d) co-ordination of the co-operation under sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) shall be through diplomatic or other agreed channels. The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined bilaterally or multilaterally by the States Parties concerned. 4. States Parties shall co-operate and consult, as appropriate, with each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international transport. 5. A State Party may consult and co-operate, as appropriate, with other States Parties directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, with a view to obtaining their guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of its national system of physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities. 8. Article 6 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties provide information to international organizations or to States that are not parties to this Convention in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. A State Party that has received information in confidence from another State Party may provide this information to third parties only with the consent of that other State Party. 2. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material or nuclear facilities. 9. Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. The intentional commission of: (a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment; (b) a theft or robbery of nuclear material; (c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; (d) an act which constitutes the carrying, sending, or moving of nuclear material into or out of a State without lawful authority; (e) an act directed against a nuclear facility, or an act interfering with the operation of a nuclear facility, where the offender intentionally causes, or where he knows that the act is likely to cause, death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances, unless the act is undertaken in conformity with the national law of the State Party in the territory of which the nuclear facility is situated; (f) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of intimidation; (g) a threat: (i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment or to commit the offence described in sub-paragraph (e), or (ii) to commit an offence described in sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act; (h) an attempt to commit any offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e); (i) an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in subparagraphs (a) to (h); (j) an act of any person who organizes or directs others to commit an offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (h); and (k) an act which contributes to the commission of any offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (h) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such act shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g), or (ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) shall be made a punishable offence by each State Party under its national law. 10. After Article 11 of the Convention, two new articles, Article 11 A and Article 11 B, are added as follows: None of the offences set forth in article 7 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 7 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons. 11. After Article 13 of the Convention, a new Article 13 A is added as follows: Nothing in this Convention shall affect the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes that is undertaken to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 12. Paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 3. Where an offence involves nuclear material in domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, or where an offence involves a nuclear facility and the alleged offender remains in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offence. 13. Article 16 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: 1. A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary five years after the entry into force of the Amendment adopted on 8 July 2005 to review the implementation of this Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation. 2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of States Parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective. 14. Footnote (na b/ )of Annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following text: (na b/ )Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 gray/hour (100 rads/hour) at one metre unshielded. 15. Footnote (na e/ )of Annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following text: (na e/ )Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I and II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 gray/hour (100 rads/hour) at one metre unshielded. 1. Naslov Konvencije o fizičnem varovanju jedrskega materiala, sprejete 26. oktobra 1979 (v nadaljevanju konvencija), se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 2. Preambula konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: DRŽAVE POGODBENICE TE KONVENCIJE PRIZNAVAJO pravico vseh držav, da razvijajo in uporabljajo jedrsko energijo v miroljubne namene in njihove zakonite interese za potencialne koristi, ki bi jih imela miroljubna uporaba jedrske energije, SO PREPRIČANE, da je treba spodbujati mednarodno sodelovanje in prenos jedrske tehnologije za miroljubno uporabo jedrske energije, UPOŠTEVAJO, da je fizično varovanje življenjskega pomena za varovanje javnega zdravja, splošno varnost, varovanje okolja ter nacionalno in mednarodno varnost, UPOŠTEVAJO cilje in načela Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov glede ohranjanja mednarodnega miru in varnosti in spodbujanja dobrih sosedskih in prijateljskih odnosov in sodelovanja med državami, GLEDE NA TO, da se na podlagi četrtega odstavka 2. člena Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov »vse članice v svojih mednarodnih odnosih vzdržujejo grožnje s silo ali uporabe sile, ki bi bila naperjena proti ozemeljski nedotakljivosti ali politični neodvisnosti katere koli države ali ki bi bila kako drugače nezdružljiva s cilji Združenih narodov«, SE SKLICUJEJO na Deklaracijo o ukrepih za odpravo mednarodnega terorizma, ki je priloga resolucije Generalne skupščine 49/60 z dne 9. decembra 1994, ŽELIJO odpraviti potencialne nevarnosti, ki jih povzročajo nedovoljeno trgovanje, protipravni odvzem in uporaba jedrskega materiala ter sabotaža jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov, in opažajo, da je fizično varovanje pred takimi dejanji postalo vprašanje povečane državne in mednarodne zaskrbljenosti, SO MOČNO ZASKRBLJENE zaradi naraščanja terorističnih dejanj v vseh oblikah in pojavih po vsem svetu in zaradi nevarnosti, ki jih sprožata mednarodni terorizem in organiziran kriminal, VERJAMEJO, da ima fizično varovanje pomembno vlogo pri podpiranju ciljev neširjenja jedrskega orožja in boja proti terorizmu, ŽELIJO s to konvencijo prispevati h krepitvi fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov, ki se uporabljajo v miroljubne namene, po vsem svetu, SO PREPRIČANE, da so kazniva dejanja v zvezi z jedrskim materialom in jedrskimi objekti vprašanje, ki povzroča resno zaskrbljenost, in da je treba nujno sprejeti ustrezne in učinkovite ukrepe ali okrepiti obstoječe ukrepe za preprečevanje, odkrivanje in kaznovanje takih kaznivih dejanj, ŽELIJO še nadalje krepiti mednarodno sodelovanje, da bi sprejeli učinkovite ukrepe za fizično varovanje jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov v skladu z notranjo zakonodajo vsake države pogodbenice in s to konvencijo, SO PREPRIČANE, da mora ta konvencija prispevati k varni uporabi, skladiščenju in prevozu jedrskega materiala in varnemu delovanju jedrskih objektov, PRIZNAVAJO, da obstajajo mednarodno oblikovana priporočila za fizično varovanje, ki se občasno posodabljajo, in lahko zagotovijo smernice glede sodobnih načinov za doseganje učinkovitih ravni fizičnega varovanja, PRIZNAVAJO tudi, da je za učinkovito fizično varovanje jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov, ki se uporabljajo za vojaške namene, odgovorna država, ki ima tak jedrski material in jedrske objekte, in so prepričane, da je treba tak material in objekte še naprej strogo fizično varovati SO SE DOGOVORILE: 3. V 1. členu konvencije se za točko c dodata dve novi točki, ki se glasita: (d) »jedrski objekt« je objekt (vključno s povezanimi zgradbami in opremo), v katerem se jedrski material proizvaja, predeluje, uporablja, obdeluje, skladišči ali odlaga, če bi poškodba na takem objektu ali poseg vanj lahko privedla do sproščanja precejšnjih količin sevanja ali radioaktivnega materiala; (e) »sabotaža« je vsako namerno dejanje, usmerjeno proti jedrskemu objektu ali jedrskemu materialu pri uporabi, skladiščenju ali prevozu, ki bi lahko neposredno ali posredno ogrozilo zdravje in varnost delavcev, prebivalstva ali okolja zaradi izpostavljanja sevanju ali sproščanja radioaktivnih snovi. 4. Za 1. členom konvencije se doda nov 1. A člen, ki se glasi: Nameni konvencije so doseganje in vzdrževanje učinkovitega fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala, ki se uporablja v miroljubne namene, in jedrskih objektov, ki se uporabljajo v miroljubne namene v svetu, preprečevanje kaznivih dejanj v zvezi s takim materialom in objekti v svetu ter boj proti njim kakor tudi olajšanje sodelovanja med državami pogodbenicami v te namene. 5. 2. člen konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 1. Ta konvencija se uporablja za jedrski material, ki se uporablja v miroljubne namene, pri njegovi uporabi, skladiščenju in prevozu ter za jedrske objekte, ki se uporabljajo v miroljubne namene, če se 3. in 4. člen ter četrti odstavek 5. člena te konvencije uporabljajo za tak jedrski material, samo dokler je v mednarodnem jedrskem prevozu. 2. Za vzpostavitev, izvajanje in vzdrževanje režima fizičnega varovanja v posamezni državi pogodbenici je v celoti odgovorna ta država. 3. Razen obveznosti, ki so jih države pogodbenice s to konvencijo izrecno prevzele, se nobena določba te konvencije ne razlaga kot kršitev suverenih pravic države. 4. (a) Nobena določba te konvencije ne vpliva na druge pravice, obveznosti in odgovornosti držav pogodbenic po mednarodnem pravu, zlasti ne na cilje in načela Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov in mednarodnega humanitarnega prava. (b) Ta konvencija ne ureja dejavnosti oboroženih sil med oboroženim spopadom, kakor se ti izrazi razumejo po mednarodnem humanitarnem pravu, ki se urejajo s tem pravom, prav tako ta konvencija ne ureja dejavnosti, ki jih izvajajo vojaške sile države pri opravljanju svojih uradnih dolžnosti, če se urejajo z drugimi pravili mednarodnega prava. (c) Nobena določba te konvencije se ne razlaga kot zakonito dovoljenje za uporabo ali grožnjo uporabe sile proti jedrskemu materialu ali jedrskim objektom, ki se uporabljajo v miroljubne namene. (d) Nobena določba te konvencije ne opravičuje ali pravno ne dopušča dejanj, ki so sicer protipravna, niti ne preprečuje pregona po drugih zakonih. 5. Ta konvencija se ne uporablja za jedrski material, ki se uporablja ali zadržuje za vojaške namene, ali za jedrski objekt, v katerem je tak material. 6. Za 2. členom konvencije se doda nov 2. A člen, ki se glasi: 1. Vsaka država pogodbenica vzpostavi, izvaja in vzdržuje ustrezen režim fizičnega varovanja, ki se uporablja za jedrski material in jedrske objekte pod njeno jurisdikcijo, da: (a) zaščiti jedrski material, ki se uporablja, skladišči in prevaža, pred krajo in drugim protipravnim odvzemom; (b) zagotovi izvajanje hitrih in vsestranskih ukrepov za odkritje in po potrebi, povrnitev pogrešanega ali ukradenega jedrskega materiala; če je material zunaj njenega ozemlja, država pogodbenica ravna v skladu s 5. členom; (c) zaščiti jedrski material in jedrske objekte pred sabotažo, in (d) ublaži ali zmanjša radiološke posledice sabotaže. 2. Pri izvajanju prvega odstavka vsaka država pogodbenica: (a) sprejema in izvaja zakone in druge predpise za urejanje fizičnega varovanja; (b) ustanovi ali imenuje pristojni organ ali organe, ki so odgovorni za izvajanje zakonov in drugih predpisov, in (c) sprejema druge ustrezne ukrepe, potrebne za fizično varovanje jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov. 3. Pri izvajanju obveznosti iz prvega in drugega odstavka vsaka država pogodbenica ne glede na druge določbe te konvencije uporablja, če je primerno in izvedljivo, navedena temeljna načela fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov: TEMELJNO NAČELO A: Odgovornost države Država je v celoti odgovorna za vzpostavitev, izvajanje in vzdrževanje režima fizičnega varovanja v državi. TEMELJNO NAČELO B: Odgovornosti med mednarodnim prevozom Odgovornost države za zagotavljanje ustreznega varovanja jedrskega materiala vključuje njegov mednarodni prevoz do trenutka, ko se ta odgovornost pravilno, kot je primerno, prenese na drugo državo. TEMELJNO NAČELO C: Zakoni in drugi predpisi Država je odgovorna za sprejemanje in izvajanje zakonov in drugih predpisov za urejanje fizičnega varovanja. Ti zakoni in drugi predpisi naj vsebujejo zahteve za fizično varovanje ter sistem ocenjevanja in podeljevanja dovoljenj ali drugih postopkov za izdajanje pooblastil. Vključujejo naj sistem nadzora jedrskih objektov in prevoza zaradi preverjanja skladnosti z veljavnimi zahtevami in pogoji dovoljenja ali drugega pooblastila ter zagotavljanja načina za uveljavitev veljavnih zahtev in pogojev, vključno z učinkovitimi sankcijami. TEMELJNO NAČELO D: Pristojni organ Država naj ustanovi ali imenuje pristojen organ, ki je odgovoren za izvajanje zakonov in drugih predpisov in ima ustrezna pooblastila, pristojnosti ter finančna sredstva in kadre za izpolnjevanje dodeljenih odgovornosti. Država naj z ustreznimi ukrepi zagotovi učinkovito neodvisnost med nalogami pristojnega državnega organa in nalogami katerega koli drugega organa, odgovornega za spodbujanje ali uporabo jedrske energije. TEMELJNO NAČELO E: Odgovornost imetnikov dovoljenj Odgovornosti za izvajanje različnih delov fizičnega varovanja v državi je treba jasno določiti. Država naj zagotovi, da so za izvajanje fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala ali jedrskih objektov primarno odgovorni imetniki ustreznih dovoljenj ali drugih pooblastil (npr. uporabniki ali prevozniki). TEMELJNO NAČELO F: Varnostna kultura Vse organizacije, ki sodelujejo pri fizičnem varovanju, morajo dati potrebno prednost varnostni kulturi, njenemu razvoju in ohranjanju, ki sta potrebna za zagotovitev njenega učinkovitega izvajanja v celotni organizaciji. TEMELJNO NAČELO G: Ogroženost Fizično varovanje države naj temelji na trenutni državni oceni ogroženosti. TEMELJNO NAČELO H: Stopnjevan pristop Zahteve za fizično varovanje naj temeljijo na stopnjevanem pristopu ob upoštevanju trenutne ocene ogroženosti, relativne privlačnosti, lastnosti materiala in možnih posledic, povezanih z nepooblaščenim odvzemom jedrskega materiala in sabotažo jedrskega materiala ali jedrskih objektov. TEMELJNO NAČELO I: Obramba v globino Državne zahteve za fizično varovanje naj bodo zasnovane na več ravneh in s kombinacijo metod varovanja (strukturna ali druga tehnična, kadrovska in organizacijska), ki jih mora nasprotnik premagati ali obiti, da bi dosegel svoje cilje. TEMELJNO NAČELO J: Zagotavljanje kakovosti Treba je vzpostaviti in izvajati politiko in programe za zagotavljanje kakovosti za zagotovitev zaupanja, da so izpolnjene natančno določene zahteve za vse dejavnosti, pomembne za fizično varovanje. TEMELJNO NAČELO K: Načrti za izredne razmere Vsi imetniki dovoljenj in pristojni organi morajo pripraviti načrte za izredne (nujne) razmere, ukrepanje ob nepooblaščenem odvzemu jedrskega materiala ali sabotaži jedrskih objektov ali jedrskega materiala ali tovrstnih poskusih. TEMELJNO NAČELO L: Zaupnost Država mora določiti zahteve za zaščito zaupnosti informacij, katerih nepooblaščeno razkritje bi lahko ogrozilo fizično varovanje jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov. 4. (a) Ta člen se ne uporablja za jedrski material, za katerega se država upravičeno odloči, da ne potrebuje režima fizičnega varovanja, vzpostavljenega v skladu s prvim odstavkom, ob upoštevanju lastnosti materiala, njegove količine in relativne privlačnosti ter možnih radioloških in drugih posledic, povezanih s kakršnim koli nepooblaščenim dejanjem, usmerjenim proti njemu, ter trenutno oceno njegove ogroženosti. (b) Jedrski material, za katerega se v skladu s prejšnjo točko četrtega odstavka ta člen ne uporablja, je treba varovati v skladu s prakso preudarnega upravljanja. 7. 5. člen konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 1. Države pogodbenice določijo svoje točke za stike v zvezi z zadevami s področja uporabe konvencije ter se o tem medsebojno obvestijo neposredno ali prek Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo. 2. Pri tatvini, ropu ali drugem nezakonitem odnašanju jedrskega materiala ali verjetnosti takih dejanj države pogodbenice v skladu s svojim notranjim pravom sodelujejo in pomagajo vrniti in zavarovati tak material vsaki državi, ki to zahteva. Zlasti: (a) država pogodbenica ustrezno ukrepa, tako da o vsaki tatvini, ropu ali drugem nezakonitem odnašanju jedrskega materiala ali verjetnosti takih dejanj čim prej obvesti druge države, za katere meni, da so za to zainteresirane, po potrebi pa tudi Mednarodno agencijo za atomsko energijo in druge ustrezne mednarodne organizacije; (b) zainteresirane države pogodbenice po potrebi izmenjavajo informacije med seboj, z Mednarodno agencijo za atomsko energijo in drugimi ustreznimi mednarodnimi organizacijami, da bi zavarovale ogroženi jedrski material, preverile nedotaknjenost zabojnika za prevoz ali povrnile protipravno odneseni material ter pri tem: (i) usklajujejo svoja prizadevanja po diplomatskih in drugih poteh, o katerih dosežejo soglasje; (ii) pomagajo, če kdo zahteva; (iii) zagotovijo vrnitev odkritega jedrskega materiala, ki je bil ukraden ali pogrešan kot posledica omenjenih okoliščin. Način, kako uresničevati sodelovanje, določijo zainteresirane države pogodbenice. 3. Ob zelo verjetni nevarnosti ali sabotaži jedrskega materiala ali jedrskega objekta države pogodbenice čim bolj sodelujejo med seboj v skladu s svojim notranjim pravom in svojimi ustreznimi obveznostmi po mednarodnem pravu, kot sledi: (a) če država pogodbenica izve za zelo verjetno nevarnost sabotaže jedrskega materiala ali jedrskega objekta v drugi državi, se odloči o ustreznih ukrepih z namenom, da o tej nevarnosti čim prej obvesti to državo, po potrebi pa tudi Mednarodno agencijo za atomsko energijo in druge ustrezne mednarodne organizacije, da prepreči sabotažo; (b) pri sabotaži jedrskega materiala ali jedrskega objekta v državi pogodbenici in če so po njenem mnenju verjetni radiološki vplivi v drugih državah, država pogodbenica ne glede na druge obveznosti po mednarodnem pravu ustrezno ukrepa in čim prej obvesti državo ali države, v katerih bo verjeten radiološki vpliv, po potrebi pa obvesti tudi Mednarodno agencijo za atomsko energijo in druge ustrezne mednarodne organizacije, da se ublažijo ali zmanjšajo radiološke posledice sabotaže; (c) če v okoliščinah iz točk a in b država pogodbenica zaprosi za pomoč, se vsaka država pogodbenica, ki ji je zaprosilo za pomoč namenjeno, takoj odloči in neposredno ali prek Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo sporoči državi pogodbenici, ki prosi za pomoč, ali lahko zaprošeno pomoč zagotovi, ter obseg in pogoje pomoči, ki jih lahko zagotovi; (d) usklajevanje sodelovanja iz točk a do c teče po diplomatskih ali drugih dogovorjenih poteh. Način, kako uresničevati to sodelovanje, določijo zainteresirane države pogodbenice dvostransko ali večstransko. 4. Države pogodbenice se po potrebi posvetujejo in medsebojno sodelujejo neposredno ali prek Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo in drugih ustreznih mednarodnih organizacij, da si zagotovijo smernice za načrtovanje, vzdrževanje in izboljšanje sistemov fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala v mednarodnem prevozu. 5. Država pogodbenica se lahko po potrebi posvetuje in sodeluje z drugimi državami pogodbenicami neposredno ali prek Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo in drugih ustreznih mednarodnih organizacij, da si zagotovi njihove smernice za načrtovanje, vzdrževanje in izboljšanje svojega notranjega sistema fizičnega varovanja jedrskih objektov in jedrskega materiala pri notranji uporabi, skladiščenju in prevozu. 8. 6. člen konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 1. Države pogodbenice ustrezno ukrepajo v skladu s svojim notranjim pravom, da bi zavarovale informacije, ki jih po tej konvenciji prejmejo kot zaupne od druge države pogodbenice ali na podlagi udeležbe v kakšni dejavnosti pri izvajanju te konvencije. Če države pogodbenice pošljejo informacije kot zaupne mednarodnim organizacijam ali državam, ki niso pogodbenice te konvencije, se ukrene vse potrebno za varovanje tajnosti teh informacij. Država pogodbenica, ki je prejela zaupne informacije od druge države pogodbenice, sme te informacije poslati tretjim le na podlagi soglasja te države pogodbenice. 2. V skladu s to konvencijo se od nobene države pogodbenice ne sme zahtevati, da pošlje informacije, ki jih v skladu z notranjim pravom ne sme sporočiti, ali bi utegnile ogroziti njeno varnost ali fizično varovanje jedrskega materiala ali jedrskih objektov. 9. Prvi odstavek 7. člena konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 1. Naslednja naklepno storjena dejanja: (a) neupravičeno sprejemanje, posest, uporaba, prenos, sprememba, odlaganje ali razširjanje jedrskega materiala, ki povzroči ali utegne povzročiti smrt ali resno poškodbo katere koli osebe ali precejšnjo premoženjsko ali okoljsko škodo; (b) tatvina ali rop jedrskega materiala; (c) pridobitev jedrskega materiala z goljufijo ali poneverbo; (d) dejanje, ki pomeni prenašanje, pošiljanje ali premikanje jedrskega materiala v državo ali iz nje brez zakonskega pooblastila; (e) dejanje, usmerjeno proti jedrskemu objektu, ali dejanje, ki posega v delovanje jedrskega objekta, pri čemer storilec naklepno povzroči ali ve, da je verjetno, da bo dejanje povzročilo smrt ali hudo poškodbo katere koli osebe ali precejšnjo premoženjsko ali okoljsko škodo zaradi izpostavljenosti sevanju ali sproščanja radioaktivnih snovi, razen če je dejanje storjeno v skladu z notranjim pravom države pogodbenice, na katere ozemlju je jedrski objekt; (f) vsaka zahteva za jedrski material z grožnjo uporabe sile ali z uporabo sile ali drugega načina ustrahovanja; (g) grožnja: (i) da se bo jedrski material uporabil tako, da bo povzročil smrt ali resno poškodbo katere koli osebe ali precejšnjo premoženjsko ali okoljsko škodo ali da bo storjeno kaznivo dejanje iz točke e, ali (ii) da bo storjeno kaznivo dejanje iz točk b in e, da bi bila katera koli fizična ali pravna oseba, mednarodna organizacija ali država prisiljena, da stori ali opusti katero koli dejanje; (h) poskus storitve katerega koli dejanja iz točk a do e; (i) dejanje, ki pomeni udeležbo pri katerem koli dejanju iz točk a do h; (j) dejanje katere koli osebe, ki organizira ali usmerja druge k storitvi kaznivega dejanja iz točk a do h, in (k) dejanje, ki pripomore k storitvi kaznivega dejanja iz točk a do h, ki ga stori skupina oseb, ki delujejo s skupnim namenom; tako dejanje je naklepno in je: (i) storjeno z namenom spodbujanja kriminalne dejavnosti ali namena skupine, kadar taka dejavnost ali namen vključuje storitev kaznivega dejanja iz točk a do g, ali (ii) storjeno ob poznavanju namena skupine, da bo storila kaznivo dejanje iz točk a do g, bodo kazniva po notranjem pravu vsake države pogodbenice. 10. Za 11. členom konvencije se dodasta dva nova člena, 11. A člen in 11. B člen, ki se glasita: Nobeno kaznivo dejanje iz 7. člena se za namene izročitve ali vzajemne pravne pomoči ne šteje kot politično kaznivo dejanje ali kaznivo dejanje, povezano s političnim kaznivim dejanjem ali kot politično motivirano kaznivo dejanje. Zato zaprosilo za izročitev ali vzajemno pravno pomoč, ki temelji na takem kaznivem dejanju, ne sme biti zavrnjeno izključno z utemeljitvijo, da je to politično kaznivo dejanje ali kaznivo dejanje, povezano s političnim kaznivim dejanjem, ali politično motivirano kaznivo dejanje. Nobena določba te konvencije se ne razlaga kot obveznost izročitve ali zagotovitve vzajemne pravne pomoči, če ima zaprošena država pogodbenica utemeljene razloge za domnevo, da je bilo zaprosilo za izročitev zaradi kaznivih dejanj iz 7. člena ali za vzajemno pravno pomoč v zvezi s takimi kaznivimi dejanji poslano z namenom preganjanja ali kaznovanja osebe zaradi njene rase, veroizpovedi, narodnosti, etnične pripadnosti ali političnega prepričanja ali da bi ravnanje v skladu z zaprosilom povzročilo poseg v njen položaj iz katerega koli od teh razlogov. 11. Za 13. členom konvencije se doda nov 13. A člen, ki se glasi: Nobena določba v tej konvenciji ne vpliva na prenos jedrske tehnologije v miroljubne namene, ki se izvede zaradi krepitve fizičnega varovanja jedrskega materiala in jedrskih objektov. 12. Tretji odstavek 14. člena konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 3. Kadar se kaznivo dejanje nanaša na jedrski material pri uporabi, skladiščenju ali prevozu v državi pogodbenici, domnevni storilec in jedrski material pa ostaneta na ozemlju države pogodbenice, na katerem je bilo to kaznivo dejanje storjeno, ali kadar kaznivo dejanje vključuje jedrski objekt in domnevni storilec ostane na ozemlju države pogodbenice, v kateri je bilo kaznivo dejanje storjeno, se nobena določba te konvencije ne razlaga kot obveznost te države pogodbenice, da daje obvestila o kazenskem postopku, ki teče zaradi takega kaznivega dejanja. 13. 16. člen konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: 1. Depozitar skliče konferenco držav pogodbenic pet let po začetku veljavnosti sprememb, sprejetih 8. julija 2005, da se preverita izvajanje te konvencije in njena ustreznost, kar zadeva preambulo, celoten izvedbeni del in priloge z vidika takratnih razmer. 2. Večina držav pogodbenic lahko zatem v ne manj kot petletnih presledkih skliče nadaljnje konference z istim namenom tako, da to predlaga depozitarju. 14. Opomba (na b/) Priloge II konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: (na b/) Material, ki ni bil obsevan v reaktorju, ali material, ki je bil obsevan v reaktorju, pri čemer je stopnja obsevanosti 1 gray/uro (100 rad/uro) ali manj v razdalji enega metra brez zaslona. 15. Opomba (na e/) Priloge II konvencije se spremeni tako, da se glasi: (na e/) Drugo gorivo, ki se po svojem prvotnem deležu fisijskega materiala razvršča kot material iz I. in II. kategorije pred obsevanjem, se lahko uvrsti za eno kategorijo niže, medtem ko je stopnja obsevanosti večja od 1 gray/uro (100 rad/uro) v razdalji enega metra brez zaslona.